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Animation and Memory 
In Pixar’s Inside Out (Docter and Del Carmen, 2015), Joy and Sadness navigate around their 
host Riley’s long-term memory where coloured orbs representing different events in her 
past are stored on shelves. The film imagines memory as fixed content that can be recalled 
as needed. However, developments in the interdisciplinary field of memory studies now 
consider memory to be much more complex than this. Like the term realism discussed 
elsewhere in this volume, memory is a slippery thing – it is better understood as always in a 
state of becoming, as related to the present more than the past, and as a creative, 
networked process rather than as a simple transmission of historical data. After introducing 
some of the broad ideas related to contemporary studies of media and memory, this 
chapter focuses on the ways in which we can remember the past through and with 
animation, and how the form can represent memory, concentrating particularly on issues of 
trauma and witnessing, collective memory and identity, and nostalgia.  
 
Understanding Memory 
Memory is a familiar term, yet it can be difficult to define without confusing it with the past 
– events that have happened – and History – the telling of such events. If History (and I use 
the capital H here purposely to refer to the practice of historians) is the construction of 
narratives of the past following a cause and effect logic, often detailed with empirical data, 
then memory refers to our experience of the past in the present. Memory highlights the 
fragmentary nature of temporality, and refers to our bodily and sensual relations to events 
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that have previously happened. Memory is incomplete, inaccurate, messy and subjective. It 
is not fixed, but rather it is fluid. Memory is a creation that is never complete and involves 
an assemblage or network of actors – human and non-human – contributing to its 
continuous development (Garde-Hansen, Hoskins and Reading 2012: 7). Memory is 
something felt and is often shared and developed with others. Although, when we 
colloquially use the word ‘memory’ we tend to mean the things we personally remember, 
the concept ‘memory’ encapsulates both personal, collective and collaborative experiences 
with the past, and how these relate to each other. It is important to remember that ‘the 
past is not preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the present’ (Halbwachs 1992: 40). 
Thus, in studying memory, we come to understand as much about the current situation as 
we do about the events being remembered.  
Media, such as animation, play an important role in the creation of memories today 
as our engagement with the past is extensively mediated (Garde-Hansen 2011, van Dijck 
2007). Marshall McLuhan’s seminal book Understanding Media (1964) introduced the idea 
that media might be able to extend human experience. Following such thinking in relation to 
memory, Alison Landsberg (2004) argues that films can serve as prosthetics, encouraging us 
to feel emotionally and bodily engaged with a past we neither witnessed nor know much 
about. Landsberg here emphasises the assemblage nature of memory (that it involves the 
interaction of organic and inorganic agents in its creation (Garde-Hansen, Hoskins, Reading 
2012: 11) as media can inspire the spectator to remember. Memory is not solely situated 
within our minds; rather it emerges through social collaborations. Given that animation 
often foregrounds the subjective – with its handmade quality and ability to resist 
photographic traditions of representation– the form can help encourage the types of 
affective responses to historical events that we tend to define as memory. 
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Memory and Animation 
Animation can highlight issues related to memory in many ways. Firstly, the creativity and 
imagination that inform memory are often highlighted in animated works, particularly when 
their frame-by-frame production is emphasised, such as with stop-motion and pixilation 
films, or when the physical imprint of the animators is materialised onscreen, such as in the 
finger marks on the surfaces of clay figures. Film phenomenologist Jennifer M. Barker, in her 
analysis of the Quay Brothers’ Street of Crocodiles (1986), argues that the foregrounding of 
the creative process in stop-motion films is indicative of play (2009: 130-32). Pixar’s first 
feature film Toy Story (Lasseter, 1996) also highlights animation’s relationship to play, 
despite its use of digital animation rather than stop-motion as we watch the adventures of 
Andy’s toys when they come alive, and follow the narrative of Woody, an old toy, with 
whom Andy no longer wants to play  when he receives his new Buzz Lightyear figure. The 
emphasis on play in Toy Story, as in many animations, is shrouded in nostalgia for childhood. 
Nostalgia is a particular feeling about the past discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
Secondly, animation particularly foregrounds embodiment. Even if we do not see the 
animator’s hands moving objects onscreen, we are aware of the human agency acting 
between frames, which enables the creation of movement. Material, non-human forms in 
animations can also provoke the spectator to feel bodily sensations in reaction to historical 
events. For example, in the Estonian short Body Memory (Keha mälu, Pikkov, 2011) – about 
the deportation of Estonians by Soviet officials – objects encourage deep visceral affect for 
the audience. The film includes anthropomorphic figures, which are made of twine, placed 
inside a model of a cattle car. The figures are seen being violently jerked around until they 
are untangled and destroyed. Barker claims that when film draws attention to a sense of 
corporal discontinuity, such as with stop-motion, this can evoke feelings of bodily 
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vulnerability within the spectator because it encourages them to recognise that the unity of 
the film – its body – is actually constructed of fragile, individual elements and the failure of 
any of these could threaten the existence of the whole (2009: 21). In Body Memory, such 
affect is not only suggested through the staccato temporality of the film, but also through 
the unravelling and metamorphosis of the twine figures, which encourage us to consider 
how our own body could be torn to pieces or changed by external forces. Such a sensation 
can enable the tragic past of Soviet deportations to resonate deep within the spectator’s 
body and thus it is through an embodied relationship with the animation that they can 
become invested in remembering this past.  
Thirdly, animation’s ability to emphasise subjective reality (Wells 1998: 27) enables it 
to explore the sensual responses of people to historical events rather than to show them 
photographically. Animation has long been interested in depicting the impossible, and the 
embodied, fluid experience of memory is certainly something that a photograph or live-
action film cannot satisfactorily depict. This is particularly significant when animations deal 
with events that are questionably real. For example, Paul Vester’s Abductees (1994) uses 
animated drawings to accompany the vocal testimony of individuals who describe their 
experiences of being abducted by aliens. The artwork attempts to both illustrate the 
interviewees’ memories and to question the reliability of subjective narratives of the past 
with interjections of iconic fantasy images, such as Bambi. This approach is also particularly 
useful for confronting trauma.  
 
Traumatic Memory 
‘A traumatic event is often understood as an aporia in subjective experience and also for the 
possibilities of representation’ (Honess Roe 2013: 156), thus whilst photographic-based live-
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action images might have difficulties engaging with trauma through traditional narratives, 
animation can offer an aesthetic response (Ibid). Following the psychoanalytical work of 
Sigmund Freud, trauma theorist Cathy Caruth defines trauma as a ‘double wound’ (1996: 3). 
By this she means that it is a ‘breach in the mind’s experience of time, self and the world’ 
and that as it reappears in flashbacks to the survivor, trauma is always ‘experienced too 
soon’ and ‘too unexpectedly to be fully known’ (1996: 4). Therefore, trauma causes the 
survivor of a horrific experience to be confronted with the past in fragments. Furthermore, 
as Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub (1992), and Janet Walker (2005) argue, because trauma 
can never be fully known, it is also shaped by fantasy and ‘disremembering’. Walker uses 
the term ‘disremembering’ to refer to the process through which fragments of the past 
allow us to begin to work through trauma even when we cannot remember the original 
event. 
Laub argues that survivors of horrific experiences cannot recognise their trauma until 
they testify to the events (1992: 57). Whilst video (analogue and digital) is often used to 
record such testimonies, it only presents the survivor telling their story – it cannot show 
events as they happened or illustrate memories of them. Often, particularly in the case of 
wars or genocides, there are few images evidencing horrendous crimes. If they do exist, 
they are often shot by the perpetrators, thus do not present the victims’ point-of-view. This 
is perhaps why there has been an increasing number of animated documentaries and 
fictional interpretations of traumatic events such as the Holocaust told from a personal 
perspective. Animation helps draw attention to an individual’s subjective response to 
events, rather than claiming to represent them as they happened. In the case of horrific 
events it might also be a ‘means for overcoming the effacement of the past blocked by 
traumatic experience’ (Honess Roe 2013: 155). This is illustrated in Waltz with Bashir 
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(Folman, 2008) in which the filmmaker uses animation to try to discover his missing 
memories of his time as a soldier in the Lebanon War.   
Another example, the short Canadian animation I was a Child of Holocaust Survivors 
(Fleming, 2010) foregrounds the complexity of memory and the significance to it of 
imagination. Fleming’s animated film is a post-memory work (Hirsch 2012), which means it 
explores the relationship that a member of the second generation (Bernice Eisenstein) has 
with her parent’s traumatic past (the Holocaust) which she did not experience first-hand. At 
one point in the film, Bernice tries to reconcile the image of her father as she knows him 
with imagery of the concentration camps and imagines him as a sheriff (as if from a Western 
film) fighting the Nazis. She cannot recall a past she did not experience, but she can feel 
affected by it and still invest imaginatively in it – remembering it from a deferred position.  
However, to think about animated films that confront real experiences of trauma 
simply as an exchange between the testifier and the viewer is to ignore the significance of 
both the animators and their imagery. What we see on screen is not simply the testimony – 
so whose memory is it? The animators are always interpreting the interviewees’ narratives, 
thus bringing their own imagining of the past to the representations and drawing attention 
to their presence as well as that of the person giving testimony (Honess Roe 2013: 87). 
Furthermore, with the ubiquity of computers in our everyday lives, our media engagements 
are now mostly composed of a ‘convergence of matter (human memory [and image]) with 
information (silicon memory)’ (Garde-Hansen, Hoskins, Reading 2012: 13). We must not 
assume that digital media, including animation, offer a more complete record of the past, 
such as the myth of the ‘total archive’ (Hoskins 2009), however, the blurring of the human 
and machine, as well as the first-hand witness and the post-memory generations – those 
born after the event - in the production of animated documentaries about traumatic pasts 
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draw attention to the ways in which memory works as an assemblage of the organic and 
non-organic, and of the past and the present for the future. We can see this in the short 
animated documentary My Good Fortune in Auschwitz (Mijn Geluk in Auschwitz, Dosky, 
2012) which uses rotoscoped images of actors performing a survivors’ memories with live-
action footage of the survivor telling his story, all of which were compiled by animators who 
did not experience this past. 
Although, trauma has often been defined as something that needs to be worked 
through (Friedländer 1996, LaCapra 1998), the recent phenomenon of stop-motion Lego 
‘brickfilms’ about the Holocaust on YouTube suggests that perhaps post-memory 
generations need to play through traumatic pasts in order to feel bodily invested in them 
(Walden, forthcoming). Whilst working through necessitates a critical distance and is most 
appropriate for first-hand witnesses, playing through enables those who did not experience 
the past in question to get close to it through bodily engagement with objects. Post-war 
generations’ playful engagement with the Holocaust can help them to materialise their 
imagined memory of it (Young 2000: 42), as they take on the responsibility for remembering 
a past they did not experience first-hand in bodily ways. This is not to suggest that they 
replace their experience of playing through with factual knowledge about real events from 
the past, but that playing through helps them to connect to it.  It is in such ways that events 
like the Holocaust can become part of collective, rather than just individual, memory.  
 
Collective Memory and National Identity 
The term ‘collective memory’, popularised by sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, suggests we 
do not remember the past as isolated individuals, but aggregate and recollect memories as 
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part of a society (1992: 38). Collective memory helps to formulate our ‘imagined 
communities’ (Anderson 2916) – those groups to which we see ourselves belonging and 
from which others are excluded. Each community might thus share a particular memory 
about a historic event, which might conflict with the way another group remembers it. Thus, 
each community remembers its own ‘version of the past’ (Neiger, Meyers and Zandberg 
2011: 5). Collective memory, then, is key to identity formation. Yet it does not suppress the 
importance of the individual, rather the notion of collective memory recognises that people 
share memories and help each other to remember events from the past. How then might 
animations speak to this discourse about collective memory?  
It is possible to see how certain animations might appear to contribute to the 
imagining of specific communities, particularly in terms of national identity. For example, 
the cuddly bear-like figure Cheburashka became an icon of Soviet animation and has since 
been the official mascot for the Russian Olympic team in the respective summer and winter 
games of 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. Japanese science-fiction anime’s Mecha characters 
often embody a renewed Japanese identity after the nation’s American occupation. As Joon 
Yang Kim argues, AstroBoy (Osamu Tezuka et al, 1963-66) became a ‘national icon for a 
dream of the reconstruction of Japan’ (2013: 179). He represented not only the other 
becoming accepted as equal to the human rulers, but that the answer to Japan’s nation 
identity of the future would be technology (Ibid.).  
Yet, if we consider collective memory to be less fixed to a specific notion of identity 
and more fluid, melding together the recollections and experiences of different individuals 
and things then we can understand animations as representing a plurality of relations to the 
past. Although an iconic of Soviet culture, Cheburashka was created by a number of Jewish 
Holocaust survivors working for the state animation studio in the U.S.S.R. Acknowledging 
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the creators’ background enables one to identify small features of Cheburashka’s story that 
challenge the idea that he represents a specific collective Soviet identity. His arrival in a 
crate of Jaffa oranges and the suitcase that he carries around point to the plight of Jewish 
refugees suggesting that there are a number of levels on which this figure can be read 
(Maya Balakirsky Katz 2016).  
Whilst the anime Akira (Katsuhiro Ôtomo, 1988) is, as is typical of anime science 
fiction, concerned with ideas of the post-human in the future, it is also a film that points to 
group identity as something that is always in flux. Akira is set in a dystopic metropolis – a 
symbol of capitalism as corruption brought to Japan by its American occupiers - yet it 
amalgamates this imagery and the greed of its protagonist with ideals about masculinity 
which are deeply rooted in Shinto culture. Although set in the future, Akira explores the 
entanglement of different layers of the past in forming contemporary notions of Japanese 
identity. Indeed, the film’s finale sees technology and human body amalgamate into a 
monstrous figure as Tetsuo is transformed, which questions the proposals made by other 
works such as Astroboy about technology as Japan’s future. Technology is as much a 
negative import of the occupying forces (consider for example the devastating impact of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaka) as it is a part of Japan’s future in Akira, as the film ends with 
Kaneda riding off in search of a new beginning with his high-spec motorbike. Both 
Cheburashka and Akira present the boundaries of collective identity as neither clearly 
defined nor stable, but feature an assemblage of references to different experiences of the 
past which speak to various notions of identity in their own times. They present identity as 
something constructed through the collaboration of various discourses about the past, 
rather than precedented on a specific collective memory. In some respects, Akira draws 
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attention to the tension between a nostalgic longing for Japan’s Shinto traditions and the 
rapid changes of modernisation.  
 
Nostalgia 
Nostalgia has been characterised as a rose-tinted, and thus unproductive, view of the past 
(Bal 1999: xi). The word ‘nostalgia’ takes its meaning from the Greek Nostos – return to the 
native land and Algos – suffering of grief. Thus nostalgia combines both a longing for the 
past and yet a mourning for a lost time that cannot return. Although the term was originally 
used in the 1600s to diagnose the illness of mercenaries far from home, the cultural 
definition, which we are more familiar with today, gained traction in the late nineteenth 
century. The idea of nostalgia as a certain feeling towards the past emerged during the 
Enlightenment – a period of rapid modernisation, and thus many scholars have considered it 
in the context of a crisis of temporality. Media engagements with nostalgia ‘could indicate a 
twofold phenomenon: a reaction to fast technologies, despite using them in desiring to slow 
down, and/or an escape from this crisis into a state of wanderlust and a homesickness that 
could be cured through media consumption’ (Niemeyer 2014: 2). As such, nostalgia should 
not simply be dismissed as sentimentality towards the past. 
Nostalgia suggests two sensations: firstly, that things are changing too rapidly, 
therefore we long to return to a time that seemed slower or at least more constant than the 
late-capitalist era with its obsessive drive towards the future. Secondly, that the present 
feels much disconnected from the past that we remember, and a past that we see as 
fundamental to shaping our personal and collective identity. Robin L. Murray and Joseph K. 
Heumann (2009) argue that nostalgia might not only help us to ‘learn from the past but also 
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to recuperate real community’. Niemeyer (2014) suggests that media can play a role in 
offering a nostalgic, albeit temporary, cure for a desire to return to a more familiar time. 
There is of course a paradox, here, for it is often digital media, such as Pixar animations, that 
offer nostalgic value – allowing us to feel comfortable in a past we seem to recognise – 
whilst they are also products of modern advancement and present post-human worlds, and 
technologically threaten the existence of the old media forms that characterised the eras to 
which we often longingly look back. 
The narratives of Pixar’s films are usually informed by nostalgia, for example the 
conflict between Woody and Buzz Lightyear in Toy Story is suggestive of the shift between a 
traditional image of the American cowboy and the Space Age. In the recent Cars 3 (Brian 
Fee, 2017), Lightning McQueen longs to return to the glory age of traditional racing. WALL-E 
(Andrew Stanton, 2008) takes us into a future world in which our sympathies are drawn to 
the titular mechanical robot, abandoned in the wastelands of Earth whilst humans are 
docile, living on a space cruiser on which digital technology does everything for them.  
Pixar’s nostalgic turn is not only rooted in its narratives, but also its films’ aesthetics. 
As Murray and Huemann (2009) note, WALL-E takes influence from Charlie Chaplin films and 
includes clips and music from Hello Dolly. In Cars 3, Lightning McQueen looks back at his 
former successes in newspaper clippings – a pre-digital media form drawn in the film as 
digital images. Pixar films, then, often depict the paradoxical nature of mediated nostalgia 
as they long for a past in which they could not exist. Yet they create this past in the digital, 
which threatens to replace the formats, such as analogue films and newspapers, 
represented onscreen.  
We have seen in this chapter how animated works can help us to remember the 
past, how they represent dimensions of memory such as trauma, post-memory and 
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nostalgia, and how we can look into the archives of animation production in particular 
nations to explore how the form contributes to the production of identities that inform 
collective memory. Animation is particular salient for exploring issues related to memory 
because it often foregrounds creativity, embodiment and the subjective, which are 
fundamental to memory. As animations often involve assemblages of objects and people in 
their creation and within their representations, they also draw attention to the complex, 
collaborative dimensions of memory. We do not simply remember on our own; rather our 
relationships with the past are shaped by our encounters with people, things, places and 
collectives. We must remember not to solely look at the representational values of 
animations, though, when thinking about memory, but interrogate their technological, 
material and aesthetic dimensions as well, in order to examine what the form can 
specifically contribute to our understanding about memory and the past.  
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